Abstract In this article I pose a series of questions about the relationships between the temporal rhythms of late capitalism and the flourishing of those relational "onto-epistemologies" so celebrated by recent theorists of the ontological turn. Bringing together recent research in political and environmental anthropology influenced by the ontological turn and the temporal insights of Michel Serres, one of the most neglected forefathers of posthumanism in science and technology studies, I explore some of the political-economic transformations that are currently impeding recognition of these ontological multiplicities. By more explicitly theorizing the temporalities of these transformations as embodied in key conservationist and educational institutions, my argument is that we can simultaneously deepen our understanding of "worlds-otherwise" and work toward clarifying the institutional conditions that so strongly mitigate against the flourishing of those worlds. 3. Ibid., 282.
Serres. By so doing, it argues that the language of ever-emergent "assemblages" and perpetually transgressive, transversal "becomings" so widely embraced by theorists of the ontological turn may ultimately represent a rather serious impediment to the kind of longue duree thinking that is essential to combating the short-termism of the contemporary economy. In short, the claim that I develop here is that this focus on "becomings" often suffers from a dangerous (though perhaps largely unintended) presentism that conceptually mirrors the short-termism of the global economy and in so doing renders us insufficiently sensitive to what Nixon has called "slow violence"
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-that is, the slowly catastrophic unfolding of environmental injury across significantly extended time spans that is an increasingly central part of what Adam has called our "timedistanciated" economy.
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I defend this proposition in three sections. First, I provide a description of the often underacknowledged political-economic background conditions against which efforts to bring back ontological multiplicity in anthropology and adjacent disciplines have acquired such urgency in recent times-namely, the singularization of value registers so characteristic of neoliberal capitalism. My primary interlocutor here is Sullivan, who in recent years has been at the forefront of exploring this singularization through sustained reflection on the financialization of environmental value that is currently both constricting mainstream approaches to the ecological crisis and rendering ontological multiplicity less and less thinkable. Second, I show how despite the considerable nuance of this approach, more explicit attention to the short-termism of contemporary capitalism is an important asset in the struggle to expand engagement with those "worlds-otherwise" that remain at the center of the ontological turn. My central contribution here is to point out that there remains a neglected connection between the foreshortening of time characteristic of the contemporary global economy and the singularization of value registers that is at least implicitly of such concern to those committed to radical alterity. And third, in the spirit of more centrally foregrounding these connections between time and environmental awareness, I conclude by offering an abbreviated exploration-partial but nevertheless, I hope, provocative-of the explicit relationship between "the presence of the past" in the present and more vitalist understandings of nonhuman agency, as found in the work of Latour's often neglected teacher, Serres. 13 I focus at some length on Serres because he has been engaged in some of the most daring efforts to think beyond the dominant Western nature/culture binary in relation to temporal concerns. The suggestion emergent from my rereading of his 1995
The Natural Contract is that we consider more fully the potential dangers of the move in anthropology and adjacent disciplines toward embracing an analytic of "becomings" as part of which, as Fortun has argued (though more specifically in relation to Latour), everything seems endlessly capable of "being composed anew." 14 Perhaps paradoxically, such models, while liberating us from the rigidities of both human exceptionalism and progressivist time, may ultimately prove to be obstacles in our efforts to embrace ontological multiplicity.
The Collapse of Ontological Difference
The overwhelmingly dominant response to the current environmental crisis at the United Nations, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, the World Busi- be done is to put prices on formerly externalized environmental goods. We simply have our balance sheets wrong, they tell us. There are incomplete entries for all the "services" performed by nature, which include things like supporting services (for example, bee pollination), provisioning services (the growth of food), regulating services (the maintenance of nutrient cycles), and perhaps most amorphously, cultural services. We will continue to destroy those with whom we share the planet if we do not properly (and by properly they always mean monetarily) account for their existence by making them visible on markets. If only nature could be properly priced; if only the amount of carbon stored in the Amazon could be rendered compatible with the amount of carbon emitted by the coal companies; if only the "services" provided by wetlands could respond to market signals, then, they tell us, we could halt environmental destruction.
How much is the world worth? The growing movement for the recognition of "Natural
Capital" (which held its inaugural conference in Edinburgh in 2013) can tell you if you care to find out.
UK-based anthropologist Sullivan has been at the forefront of calling attention to the massive ontological shifts demanded by this green growth agenda, which has 13. Bennett and Connolly, "Crumpled Handkerchief," 170.
14. Fortun, "From Latour to Late Industrialism," 315. To challenge the socio-natural disembedding that has accompanied this proliferation of interest in ecosystem services, limited liability wetlands, and human beings as microenterprises, recent work in environmental and political anthropology has sought to recover a far wider set of "natural agencies" than are usually acknowledged by the advocates of "ecosystem services." As Sullivan and her colleagues have recently noted, "We should . . . be sensitive to the cognitive implications of selecting an 'ecosystem services' framework, which (like other choices of framing before it) contracts our ways of knowing biodiversity and nature in general, with the associated cost of crowding out much of the rich variety of ecological thinking." 24 It is this "rich variety of ecological thinking" that has formed the center of recent work by ethnographers influenced by the ontological turn. Although not as explicitly concerned with the processes of commodification that preoccupy Sullivan, many of these theorists are implicitly committed to recognizing the heterogeneous entanglements of life-worlds in ways that explicitly resist both their reduction to the ontological categories most familiar to Western modernity and their capture by business logics. To provide just a few examples: As Marisol de la Cadena has recently pointed out of an Aymara (highland indigenous) community in Peru with whom she has worked for many years, when they speak of the anger of the mountains soon to be destroyed by Canadian and Australian mining companies, they are not using metaphors. 25 The mountains will get angry, her Andean friends tell her. And they are right. They mean what they say. These angry mountains defiantly resist the reductionist, human-centered languages of "natural capital"-as does the From a temporal perspective, there is no nature-culture duality: we are nature, we constitute nature and we create nature through our actions in conditions that are largely pre-set for us by evolution and history. Instead of emphasis on dualities-such as external and internal, spatial and temporal, natural and cultural-focus on time facilitates additional understanding of the interactive and constitutive aspects of socio-environmental praxis.
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Although Adam's empirical focus is on the long-term hazards of radiation, ozone damage, and hormone-disrupting chemicals, her recognition of the importance of temporal depth and multiplicity to any acknowledgment of the degree to which human and other-than-human worlds interpenetrate is an intervention that needs to be even more closely heeded by those committed to unraveling the nature/culture binary.
Second, because it seems to me that the sort of temporal narrowing so characteristic of institutions anchored in neoclassical economic assumptions is one of the conditions that most significantly distinguishes "us" (and by "us" I mean the industrialized West responsible for the vast majority of the world's carbon emissions) from those cultures that seem to enact-or at least strive toward-more emancipatory possibilities for human/nonhuman entanglements. As Fredrick Berkes has recently put it: "In indigenous and other rural communities of the world, one almost always finds institutions with rules that serve to limit short-term self-interest and promote long-term group interest." 33 Among the architects of the global financial order who are among the foremost supporters of ecosystem services, REDD+, biodiversity offsetting, and a range of other ontologically singular approaches to addressing the environmental crisis, the trend is in precisely the opposite direction: toward an all-consuming presentism. As Laura Nader puts it most succinctly, "We all need a deeper sense of time, but an imperative 31. Sullivan, "Notes on 'Natural Capital' and 'Fairy-Tales.'" 32. Adam, Timescapes of Modernity, 15.
33. Berkes, quoted in Sullivan, "Nature on the Move III," 54. Stoler, "imperial ruination"). 36 As they demonstrate, it is precisely Latour's call to "turn our back, finally, to our past, and to explore new prospects, what lies ahead, the fate of things to come" that lends ideological support-albeit perhaps inadvertently-to the projects of the institute, which are "relentlessly focused on the future" and which by and large fail to address ruination, wreckage, and the ongoing violence that so routinely flattens worlds-otherwise into the impoverished terms of "economic rationality and human-centered managerialism."
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How, then, up against the powerful short-termism that underwrites these ontological transformations, might concerned scholars work toward institutional arrangements 34. Nader, "Afterword," 321. Fitz-Henry / Multiple Temporalities and the Nonhuman Othertime in danger, a cultural pollution that we have inflicted on long-term thoughts, those guardians of the Earth, of humanity, and of things themselves.
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And then, with devastating clarity, he concludes: "If we don't struggle against the second [form of pollution], we will lose the fight against the first." 42 Again and again throughout
The Natural Contract, this is a point to which Serres returns: the fight against industrial pollution must also, and more centrally, be a fight against short-termism. The struggle against environmental disaster must never be waged exclusively in economic or technological terms, since what provides the greatest hope of endurance is "long-term memory" and "thousand-year old traditions." Perhaps the most critical way of combatting the pervasive short-termism of politics, administration, and the media, he tells us, is to learn to listen more attentively to those "long-term men" who have "fallen silent forever." Despite the androcentrism of this formulation, Serres is adamant that "we moderns" are amnesiacs who need constant reminding of those voices from the distant past who had different, and often much longer-term, orientations to the world. 45 Contrary to the accusations of his critics that he is engaged in profoundly ahistorical "free association," Serres understands attentiveness to the perpetual "presence of the past" as critical to the cultivation of perceptual habits that might ultimately change our sensorium. Now that we "live indoors," it is this kind of historical scope that affords us the greatest chance of being able to viscerally apprehend the vastly extended time frames of natural cycles (such as, for example, the mixing of the waters of the oceans, which, he tells us, is estimated at five thousand years).
Central to his repeated insistence that the "ancients" may be far more "contemporary" than "we moderns" (who are, on the contrary, "archaic in three-fourths of our actions") is his refusal to accept the notion of any sort of temporal rupture separating "us" from "them" or "past" from "present." As he explains, "In earlier times, people dreamed. Now we think. Once people sang poetry; today we experiment efficiently.
History is thus the projection of this very real exclusion into an imaginary, even imperialistic time. The temporal rupture is the equivalent of a dogmatic expulsion." 46 The persistent refusal of this "dogmatic expulsion" is what makes his approach to understanding environmental catastrophe particularly enlightening in the contemporary moment when, too often, we are surrounded by an all-consuming presentism justified by the intensifying sense that the world is utterly different from how it was at any other time in history.
As a recent review article on urban political ecology concludes, taking aim at that quintessentially rupturing notion of the Anthropocene: "The academic promise of thinking through the lens of a wholly new era is accompanied by an omnipresent urge to assign it privilege; the danger of a multidisciplinary undertaking preoccupied with an unprecedented present can easily lead to a-historicism [and] universalism." 47 While the Anthropocene presents perhaps the most vivid case of a contemporary temporal rupture, the dangers of thinking ourselves caught in an "unprecedented present" are not confined to political ecologists of the urban influenced by the Anthropocene. Indeed, similar critiques have been leveled at Latour's recent "inquiry into modes of existence" by science and technology studies scholars like Fortun, who have likewise noted that Latour's "meso-sociology of association," for all its promises, seems to suffer from a pronounced lack of historical depth, at least of the sort required by those concerned with tracking the "slow violences" and distributional injustices of chemical residues. "The politicaleconomic is largely absent," Fortun rightly notes. "The way history weights the present and future, at all scales and in all systems, is discounted. All attention is on what can be composed anew." 48 Given this presentism among even those most actively worried about the ecological crisis and all the grim novelty that it heralds-a presentism that, I have suggested, has its implicit counterpart in the calculative short-termism that drives much of the contemporary global economy-Serres's unwavering commitment to historical depth, or thinking according to nature's (always multiple) "rhythms and scope,"
serves as a timely reminder of the connectedness between historical breadth and our capacity to experience other-than-human realities. If we as academics and concerned global citizens are committed to deepening our attentiveness to the "rhythms and scope" of the natural world-or, as Sullivan has put it, "the communiqués of other(ed) culturenature ontologies"-we need to better understand the temporalities that mitigate against such attentiveness and to engage in democratic discussion about the institutional reforms necessary to better embrace (and teach) those temporalities.
For just one example of what this might look like, let us consider briefly the contemporary university. After all, it is easy to remain critical of organizations like the Breakthrough Institute and the accounting practices of the "new conservation" professionals, but the foreshortening of time that is of such concern to Serres is equally closely the temporal frameworks undergirding those Western institutions that are arguably most responsible for the neglect and degradation of other-than-human beings.
Conclusion
My proposal in this short article has been that those of us concerned with other-thanhuman worlds and practices of worlding might learn a great deal by more carefully theorizing the institutional conditions that stand in the way of the flourishing of such worlds. This engagement with institutional conditions involves both acknowledging the political-economic dynamics that implicitly underpin our burgeoning interests in radical ontological otherness and interrogating theoretical frameworks that may inadvertently further entrench the short-term time orientations of those institutions.
Thinking with Serres has allowed me to explore the importance of nurturing conditions, particularly in the increasingly corporatized academy, that might safeguard against the predominance of implicitly presentist or predominantly future-focused theoretical orientations. These orientations, many of which take inspiration from the emergent "becomings" of Deleuze and the new "compositionism" of Latour, are unlikely, it seems to me, to be able to effectively challenge the ever-narrower time scales characteristic of financial markets toward which Serres has most poignantly called our attention.
"Few periods have proved as incapable of framing immediate alternatives for themselves," Jameson has rightly warned, "[y]et a little thought suggests that it is scarcely fair to expect long-term projections or the deep breath of great collective projects from minds trained in the well-nigh synchronic habits of zero-sum calculation and of keeping an eye on profits." 55 The kinds of narrative temporal flight in which Serres so routinely engages are, it seems to me, particularly powerful antidotes to the constrictively singular time frames or "well-nigh synchronic habits of zero-sum calculation" that are increasingly culminating in the flattening of ontological difference so frequently lamented by critics of the green economy. Again and again, Serres reminds us of the intimate connections between temporal and ontological diversity, or between different timescapes and different ways of understanding "objects" or "circumstances" of human-nonhuman interrelatedness. "We are always simultaneously making gestures that are archaic, modern, and futuristic," he concludes. "Every historical era is likewise multitemporal, simultaneously drawing from the obsolete, the contemporary, and the futuristic. An object, a circumstance, is thus always polychromic, multitemporal, and reveals a time that is gathered together, with multiple pleats." 56 Remembering how to think in "crumpled" or "pleated" ways across significant time spans-as much toward ancient pasts as toward distant futures, according to speeds and rhythms both fast and slow-might allow us to listen more closely to the full range of temporalities with which we are surrounded and to thereby more viscerally appreciate the lives of the more-than-human. By better 
